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Japan's  Financial  Problems 
THE  JAPANESE  ECONOMY  has faced difficult times in the 1990s,  and the 
overall  economic  situation has grown worse  in 1998.  One core aspect 
has  been  the  emergence  of  an enormous  amount  of  bad  debt,  now 
officially  estimated to be roughly 25 percent of GDP. Resolution  of this 
problem has proceeded  slowly  and, as of the summer of  1998,  doubts 
remain concerning the ability or willingness  of the Japanese government 
to deal  adequately  with  it.  This  paper  considers  how  the  problem 
emerged, evaluates existing policies,  and offers some thoughts on prob- 
able outcomes. 
The Postwar  System 
From  the  early  1950s  through  the  1980s,  the  Japanese  economy 
operated with a financial system quite different from that of the United 
States,  though probably somewhat  similar to those  of  other countries 
that deliberately pursued industrialization.  To grasp what has happened 
in  the  1990s,  it  is  useful  to  establish  how  the  postwar  system  was 
structured. 
The  basic  shape  of  that earlier  economic  system  emerged  out  of 
government controls imposed  during the Second World War, although 
a number of changes were made in the late 1940s and early 1950s. I The 
hand of government was heavy,  inspired by the explicit  goal of guiding 
the economy  and a strong mistrust of  markets.  Core elements  of  this 
system included conservative  fiscal policies,  strong control of financial 
1. For the basis in government  controls, see Noguchi (1995). 
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markets,  corporate  governance  emphasizing  managerial  control,  en- 
couragement of company-based  unions and so-called  lifetime  employ- 
ment  (in  large  firms),  encouragement  of  cartels  and other  forms  of 
cooperative  industrial behavior, enforcement of very strong protection- 
ist barriers on both trade and investment,  and the creation of  vertical 
and hierarchical  keiretsu  (enterprise  group) relationships.  While  they 
did not emerge from any overarching theoretical concept,  in retrospect 
the various pieces  of the structure appear to have been mutually con- 
sistent or reinforcing. 
In  the  financial  sector,  the  hand  of  government  was  particularly 
heavy for reasons that reflected the desire to guide the economy.  Nor- 
mally,  a financial system is composed  of a variety of direct and indirect 
methods  of  connecting  savers  to those  engaged  in real investment- 
banking,  stock  markets,  bond  markets,  and various  other  forms  of 
corporate financial paper. Because of the variations in risk and expected 
return, there are reasons for a robust system  to comprise  a mixture of 
all of these financing methods. 
However,  financial markets can be a problem for a government that 
desires  to guide  industrialization.  In bond and stock markets,  private 
institutions  make judgments  on creditworthiness  in deciding  to under- 
write bond or stock  issues,  and a myriad individual  actors then deter- 
mine the price of those instruments in the market. The large number of 
such investors,  and their demand for credible assessments  from invest- 
ment banks and rating agencies,  make it difficult  for a government  to 
manipulate bond and stock  markets.  Banking  and insurance,  by con- 
trast, are much easier to influence,  because  the number of institutions 
is relatively  small and transactions with borrowers are nontransparent. 
The Japanese government,  therefore, chose to emasculate the stock and 
bond markets in favor of  intermediation through banks and insurance 
companies. 
Bonds  were  easily  controlled  by  establishing  very  stiff  eligibility 
requirements  and granting discretionary  authority for approval to the 
Japanese  Ministry  of  Finance  (MOF).  This  effectively  permitted the 
MOF to allow only a handful of favored corporations-the  government- 
owned telephone company, Nippon Telephone and Telegraph, principal 
among them-to  issue bonds until the 1980s. 
The stock market was trivialized  by eliminating  its role as a market 
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stock  ownership  from  corporate  control,  such  as  mutual  long-term 
shareholding and issuance of new shares to existing  shareholders at par 
value, reduced the stock market to a purely speculative game. Corporate 
managers were  not influenced  by movements  in share prices,  since  a 
falling  price did not expose  firms to takeover bids; shareholders could 
not express discontent through the board of directors,  since these were 
composed  mainly of the firm's managers; and executive  compensation 
was not tied to stock performance. 
The  Japanese  government  then  controlled  banking  and  insurance 
through the regulatory game.2 With total control  of  interest rates for 
deposits and for loans,  of the design and pricing of insurance products, 
and of  entry  into  both  industries,  the  Ministry  of  Finance  was  in  a 
position to virtually guarantee profits. Banks were segmented  into nar- 
row niches: short-term lending versus long-term,  nationwide operations 
versus regional and locally  constrained operations,  and lending to large 
corporations versus small business.  In exchange  for being granted such 
protected and profitable market niches,  banks and insurance companies 
saw fit to pay attention to the government's  formal and informal signals 
about the allocation of credit. This stylistic picture is undoubtedly over- 
drawn; banks  made  their own  decisions  on  many  loans  and did  not 
always  follow  advice  or signals.  They  could  also  cheat  on loan  rate 
limits  through the use  of  compensating  deposit  requirements for bor- 
rowers (but note that the government's  tolerance  of this practice only 
increased the banks' profits,  by widening  the spread between  low  de- 
posit rates and loan rates). And certainly, the MOF had regulatory goals 
other than guiding  the economy,  paramount among them preventing  a 
repetition of  the extensive  bank failures  of  the  1920s.  Nevertheless, 
this model of a highly  regulated and profitable banking and insurance 
sector as a vehicle  for influencing the allocation of credit seems largely 
valid. 
One outcome of this system  was household  financial portfolios  that 
relied heavily  on savings  accounts  in banks (plus  life  insurance poli- 
cies),  and borrowers who  relied  very heavily  on bank loans.  Table  1 
shows household financial portfolios.  In 1977 Japanese households held 
74 percent of financial assets in the form of currency and bank deposits, 
2.  For an elegant  presentation  of one economic model of the game played between 
regulators  and  the regulated,  see Wallner  (1997). 350  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1998 
Table 1. Household  Financial Portfolios,  Japan and the United Statesa 
Percent  of financial  assets 
Japanb  United Statesc 
Item  March  1977  March  1996  1996 
Currency  and  demand  deposits  15.6  10.0  3.8 
Time and  savings  depositsd  57.9  51.8  21.5 
Insurance  13.2  25.4  5.0 
Stocks  and  bonds  13.3  12.8  69.7 
Source: Bank of Japan (1977,  1996); Statistical Abstract of the United States,  1997 
a  Based on flow of funds data. 
b. Japanese data do not include miscellaneous assets 
c.  For the sake of comparison, table omits several items included in the U S  data but not found in the Japanese data. 
These items represent 49 percent of total household financial assets in 1996. 
d. Japanese data include trusts. 
an enormous  share that had drifted down only  modestly  to 62 percent 
by  1996 (with all of this shift toward insurance, rather than stocks and 
bonds).  The  contrast with  the United  States,  where  households  held 
only  25 percent of assets  in the form of currency and bank deposits  in 
1996,  is startling. 
The Japanese corporate sector exhibited a similar dependency on the 
banking sector. While bank loans represented only 67 percent of Amer- 
ican corporate debt in the mid-1970s,  they represented 95 percent of 
Japanese corporate borrowing. 
Another difference  between  American  and Japanese financing  pat- 
terns is the ratio of outstanding loans to GDP.  Japanese firms have not 
only  relied  more heavily  on bank loans  than on bonds,  but they have 
also  relied  more  heavily  on  external  borrowing  than have  American 
firms. The result,  shown  in figure  1, is that the ratio of bank loans to 
GDP has been much higher in Japan. In the United States,  outstanding 
bank loans  have  been  roughly  50  percent of  GDP  and have  declined 
slowly  over  time.  In  Japan,  they  have  been  higher  and  have  risen 
sharply: from  143  percent  of  GDP  in  1980,  total  loans  rose  to  206 
percent in 1995,  declining  slightly  to 201  percent in 1996.  These Jap- 
anese ratios include  loans by government  lending  institutions;  private 
sector institutions  alone had outstanding loans totaling  105 percent of 
GDP in 1980,  rising to 147 percent in 1995,  and falling  slightly  to 141 
3.  Statistical  Abstract of the United States,  1976,  p. 477; Bank of Japan (1977,  pp. 
23-24).  The Japanese  data exclude trade  credit, which is important  to Japan  but not a 
net source of funds for the corporate sector. Edward J.  Lincoln  351 
Figure 1. Bank Loans as a Share of GDP,  Japan and the United States, 1980-96 
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percent in 1996.  The flow of funds data just cited include  loans by all 
financial institutions;  other data for outstanding  loans  by commercial 
banks licensed  by the central government  (which  exclude  some  small 
institutions)  in  1996 yield  a somewhat  lower ratio of loans to GDP of 
98 percent.4 This smaller amount of lending  is commonly  used by the 
press in reporting the relative size of the bad loan problem, but it leaves 
out agricultural cooperatives  and other local  financial institutions  that 
do not fall under the jurisdiction  of the Ministry of Finance. 
Besides  being compatible  with the government's  desire to influence 
or guide the direction of industrial development,  control of the financial 
system  was  consonant  with  broader aspects  of  Japanese  society  (or 
social values,  as conceived  by a paternalistic government).  Information 
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traditionally  has not flowed  freely  in Japanese society,  except  within 
group  settings  characterized  by  close  personal  relationships.  Heavy 
reliance  on  banking,  with  its  confidential  information  relationships, 
rather than on open bond and stock markets, was thus consistent  with 
and reinforced  those  tendencies.  The  evolution  of  the  "main  bank" 
system-to  provide  the corporate oversight  that equity  holders  could 
not or did not provide-created  long-term  personal  relationships  be- 
tween  lenders and borrowers akin to the vertical keiretsu relationships 
between  product manufacturers and the suppliers  of  their component 
parts favored by government and the private sector. All Japanese social 
groups depend on ceaseless  attention to the nuances of personal rela- 
tionships,  and bankers are no exception.  In this model,  bankers who 
had access  to the internal financial accounts  of borrowers still did not 
trust the official  accounting  figures and developed  elaborate personal 
contacts,  lubricated by frequent wining and dining,  as well as dispatch- 
ing retiring bank employees  to hold management positions at borrowing 
corporations. 
The heavily controlled Japanese financial system performed its func- 
tion  of  connecting  savers  to  investors  rather well  in  the  1950s  and 
1960s.  Households  put their  savings  in bank deposits  and insurance 
policies,  and the banks and insurance firms, in turn, extended  loans to 
industry.  The  economy  grew  quickly-averaging  almost  10  percent 
annually from  1950 to  1973-suggesting  that the system  did not gen- 
erally  misdirect  funds  to unproductive  uses.  One can understand the 
present nostalgia  in Japan and the continuing  belief  among many that 
the basic system  should not change. 
However,  the  structure  also  carried  risks:  a high-growth,  bank- 
centered economic  system  implied dangerously high debt-to-equity  ra- 
tios  in the corporate sector  as a whole  and especially  in the banking 
sector. Not many years ago, economists  focused  on explaining why the 
"overloan,  overborrowing"  features  of  the banking  sector  were  not 
dangerous.5 But in retrospect,  Japan could  easily  have experienced  in 
the 1950s  and 1960s the kind of acute problem that faces  South Korea 
today.  A combination  of  international capital controls,  willingness  to 
use monetary policy  swiftly  to defend the currency, and the absence of 
other countries  simultaneously  following  the same development  strat- 
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egy shielded Japan from serious problems. When the economy  survived 
the external oil price shocks of the 1970s rather well,  confidence  in the 
robustness of the existing  system only  increased.6 
The  success  of  the  system  depended  greatly  on  the  honesty  and 
integrity  of  a well-trained  bureaucracy,  capable  of  acting  rationally 
toward the goal  of  economic  development.  In the high-growth  years, 
the bureaucracy appeared to fulfill  these  requirements,  keeping  graft 
and corruption to relatively  low levels,  while basing most decisions  on 
analysis  (even  if  relatively  simple)  of  the  appropriate allocation  of 
resources to achieve  rapid industrialization.  In the private sector,  the 
system  also  depended  on  the  ability  of  banks to  make  sensible  loan 
decisions-to  behave prudently in initial loan decisions  and then mon- 
itor closely  and skeptically.  Since  much of  the relationship  between 
government  and the private sector is opaque,  as is the bank-borrower 
interface,  the potential for abuse is high. 
Emerging Difficulties 
Even as confidence  in the validity  and strength of  the overall  eco- 
nomic  system  was  increasing,  however,  the seeds  of the problems  of 
the 1990s were sown.  The oil shock of  1973 hit just when the Japanese 
economy  was  moving  out of  the era of  10 percent potential  growth; 
emerging industrial maturity dictated a lower growth rate in the future, 
and the  oil  shock  merely  accentuated  the  transition.  Lower  growth 
implied important challenges:  a chronic excess  of desired savings  over 
desired  investment  levels,  and rising  pressure for  deregulation  from 
banks stuck in narrow market niches and disadvantaged by the shifts in 
financial flows. 
The shift in macroeconomic  balances  accompanying  the slowdown 
in growth imposed new demands on the economy.  If society  desired to 
save more than it desired to invest,  other balances would have to com- 
pensate in order to realize  the ex  ante savings  surplus. For the rest of 
the 1970s, the government provided the offset  by running a large fiscal 
deficit,  which  reached  a peak  of  6.5  percent  of  GDP  in  1978.  The 
issuance of large amounts of government  bonds to finance this deficit 
6.  See, for example, Suzuki (1981); Schmiegelow and Schmiegelow  (1989). 354  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
Table  2. Average  Annual Growth in Bank Loans to Selected Sectors in Japan 
Percent 
Year  Total  Manufacturinig  Real estate  Overseas 
1976-80  9  5  7  1  1 
1981-85  1  1  6  18  25 
1986-90  1  1  0  20  5 
Source: Bank of Japan (various years) 
led directly to the gradual breakdown of tight control over interest rates, 
as banks balked at the low rates at which the government tried to float 
increasing  amounts  of  debt.  The  ripple  effects  of  freeing  bond  rates 
from  control  eventually  brought  decontrol  of  other  interest  rates  as 
well.7 
Faced with shifting demands for funds in the market, financial insti- 
tutions also grew discontented  with the very narrow niches assigned  to 
them.  Loan demand from traditional manufacturing clients  grew more 
slowly  in the economic  environment  of the  1980s.  Searching for new 
growing  markets for loans,  Japanese  banks moved  in two  important 
directions:  into real estate and overseas.  In both cases,  the Ministry of 
Finance  accommodated  the discontent  with regulatory changes.  It en- 
couraged large commercial  banks to create nonbank subsidiaries  (a set 
of  firms known  as the jusen)  to engage  in real estate lending.  And it 
presided over piecemeal  changes  in foreign  exchange  controls,  which 
were ratified by revision  of the Foreign Exchange Control Law in 1980 
and driven further by the Yen-Dollar  Accord of  1984,  a bilateral agree- 
ment with the U.S.  government  on further financial deregulation.  By 
the mid-1980s,  foreign  direct investment  into  and out of  Japan were 
completely  liberalized  (although some complaints  of informal barriers 
on inward investment  remained),  Japanese banks and insurance com- 
panies  could  lend abroad and establish  branches abroad, and controls 
on foreigners'  portfolio  investment  into Japan had largely  been elimi- 
nated.  8 
The outcome  of  slower  growth and deregulation  during the fifteen- 
year period  1976-90  is  displayed  in table  2.  Total  bank lending  ex- 
panded at a relatively  even  pace  over  the three five-year  subperiods, 
7.  I describe  this  reluctant decontrol  of  interest  rates  in Lincoln  (1988,  pp.  130- 
210). 
8.  Lincoln  (1988,  pp.  234-65). Edward  J. Lincoln  355 
but the sectoral pattern underwent dramatic change.  Lending to manu- 
facturing was growing  at a rather modest rate of 5 to 6 percent in the 
first two subperiods but was flat in the second half of the 1980s.  Inter- 
national  lending  grew  very  rapidly  in the  first half  of  the  1980s  but 
substantially  more  slowly  in the  second  half  (perhaps because  more 
overseas  lending  was  handled  completely  offshore).  Real  estate,  by 
contrast,  continued to accelerate: from 7 percent annual growth in the 
second  half of the  1970s,  it was up in the first half of the 1980s  at an 
annual rate of  18 percent, and at a 20 percent annual rate in the second 
half of that decade. 
Rapid entry into real estate  and international lending  turned out to 
be very risky moves.  In both cases,  Japanese banks were dealing  with 
unfamiliar loan markets. To evaluate borrowers,  they relied on estab- 
lished routines: weak financial analysis,  strong personal relationships, 
and a weather  eye  to  government  signals.  While  this  approach may 
work  in  evaluating  an  existing  long-term  relationship  with  a  major 
manufacturing firm, it is fraught with danger in new markets. In addi- 
tion,  the banks continued to believe  in an implicit  guarantee of profit- 
ability from the Ministry of Finance.  No financial institution had failed 
in the postwar period,  entry to the industry had been blocked  (except 
for minimal entry into Japan by foreign  financial  institutions),  profits 
remained high,  and deposits continued to pour in from the public.  This 
combination of factors was almost guaranteed to lead to problems.9 
The  structural changes  dovetailed  with  macroeconomic  develop- 
ments in the mid-1980s.  Faced with the possibility  of recession  in the 
wake  of  the  enormous  appreciation  of  the  yen  from  spring  1985  to 
1987,  the  government  responded  with  monetary  ease.  Although  the 
government could have used an expansionary fiscal policy,  the Ministry 
of Finance deliberately  opposed  any departure from its long-term goal 
of  eliminating  the large  fiscal  deficit  that had emerged  in the  1970s. 
Monetary ease did have the intended impact of propping up the econ- 
omy:  annual  real  economic  growth  averaged  5 percent  from  1987 
through  1991.  Arguably  this  exceeded  Japan's  long-term  potential 
growth  and it  certainly  resulted  in  very  tight  labor  markets.  Under 
normal circumstances  this would  have led to higher inflation,  but yen 
9.  For an unflattering  description  of the lack of analytical  skill in Japanese  financial 
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Figure 2. Stock and Land Price Indexes in Japan, 1985-97 
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Source. Japan,  Statistics  Bureau  ( 1997), Internautioncal  Finaoncical  Stcatistics  ( 1997) 
a. Real estate prices In  the six largest  cities. 
appreciation had put manufacturers under strong price pressure, because 
they either needed to absorb a large part of yen appreciation in order to 
maintain market share abroad or faced  new pressures from imports at 
home.  Rather than general price inflation,  Japan got asset inflation,  as 
shown in figure 2.  With limited  growth in demand for funds by manu- 
facturers, banks lent more for real estate and stock market investments 
during the period of monetary ease.  In the late 1980s,  even  traditional 
borrowers became  involved  in these markets, including  manufacturing 
firms speculating  on the stock market and department stores developing 
golf  courses.  The Nikkei  Average index of stock prices tripled in value 
from 1985 to the end of  1989,  while  urban real estate prices in Japan's 
six largest cities  tripled between  1985 and 199 1. 
By  1989,  even the MOF acknowledged  that the bubbles in real estate 
and stock prices were unsustainable  and it moved  to let the air out. At Edward  J. Lincoln  357 
the time,  MOF officials  seemed very confident that they could engineer 
a modest price decline  in the two markets, hurting only  "evil"  specu- 
lators.  In the event,  all of  the gains  since  1985  were eliminated  (see 
figure 2),  leaving  mountains of bad debt. Loans directly for stock mar- 
ket activity became nonperforming with the decline  in the market. But 
in  addition,  loans  for  real  estate  development  were  often  based  on 
assumptions  about  the  future  value  of  the  land,  rather than  on  the 
estimated cash flow from its use. And in the case of plant and equipment 
loans, banks are reputed to have been more interested in the value of the 
real estate collateral than analysis of potential profit from the real invest- 
ment.  Thus firms were  able to borrow for risky or low-return projects 
simply on the basis of the real estate collateral. The plunge in stock prices 
started  in early 1990 and was over by the end of 1992, whereas land prices 
(at least urban land prices, measured in the most commonly used index) 
began to fall after 1991 and were still falling in mid-1998. 
Identifying the magnitude of these bad debts is complicated, because 
of the very lax requirements for reporting nonperforming loans in Japan. 
As recently as September 1997,  the Ministry of Finance announced that 
the banking sector held Y 28 trillion ($234 billion at then-current  exchange 
rates) in nonperforming  loans; but late in 1997 it admitted that by a broader 
definition, problem loans totaled some Y 77 trillion ($586 billion), which 
begins to approximate what private sector analysts had believed for some 
time.'0 This latter amount represents about 11 percent of all outstanding 
private bank loans in Japan (using as the denominator the broad flow of 
funds number for loans rather  than the narrower  commercial bank figure), 
and as a ratio to GDP is  16 percent. In the summer of  1998,  the new 
Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA), split off from the MOF, recalculated 
the value of problem debt as  Y 87.5  trillion ($630  billion at current ex- 
change rates), which  should be  added to  Y35.2  trillion ($253  billion) 
already declared bad,  making a total of  Y 123 trillion ($880  billion).1' 
10. "MOF Admits Banks Hold Y76.7  Trillion in Bad Loans," Asahi E-News, 
January  14, 1998; "September  Problem  Loans Rise to 28 Trillion Yen: MOF Study," 
Nikkei  Net, December  23, 1997; both articles  accessed on the worldwide  web. 
11. "FSA Tally  of All Shaky  Loans, at Y 87.5 Trillion,  Is a Stunner,"  Japan  Digest, 
July 10, 1998, p. 2. Loans are classified into four categories in Japan, from healthy 
(1) to completely  in default  (4). Categories  2 and 3 represent  loans that are performing 
but have some risk of default, and those that have been restructured  or on which the 
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This raises the ratio of bad debt to total bank loans to over  17 percent, 
and the ratio of bad debt to GDP to 25 percent. 
Note  that while  all  of  these  figures  are only  for banks,  insurance 
companies  and securities houses also harbor large financial losses.  Jap- 
anese insurance companies  rushed into the U.S.  Treasury bond market 
in the  period  1983-85  (due  both  to  deregulation  permitting  them  to 
invest overseas  and their government's  guidance toward Treasury bond 
purchases)  when  the yen  was  trading in the 220  to 260  range against 
the  dollar,  and then  rode  the  exchange  rate down.  Securities  firms 
invested  on their own  accounts  in the stock market and lent money  to 
other speculators through nonbank subsidiaries.  Figures on these losses 
do not exist.  Life  insurance and securities  firms may also be in some 
danger from real estate investment losses.  One small life insurance firm 
(Nissan  Life),  one  small  securities  firm (Sanyo  Securities),  and one 
large securities  firm (Yamaichi  Securities)  failed  in 1997. 
More bad news may be on the way.  Japanese banks have been major 
lenders in Asia,  representing 32 percent of international loans to Asian 
developing  countries in the summer of  1997-and  54 percent of loans 
to Thailand alone.  Officially,  Japanese lending  to Asian  countries  to- 
taled some $125  billion  in the summer of  1997.12  An unknown portion 
of these loans is either nonperforming or will become  so,  and the extent 
to which any bank has actually declared such loans to be nonperforming 
is unclear.  But if Japanese banks behaved with the same lack of prud- 
ence as they did in other markets, the prognosis  is not good.  While the 
magnitude of lending to other Asian countries suggests that any amount 
of  bad debt would  look  quite  small  relative  to the situation  with  do- 
mestic  bad debt,  these problems come  at the margin and mainly affect 
a small  subset  of  large banks for whom  the additional  losses  will  be 
substantial. 
As is to be expected,  the bad debt problems of the 1990s  have also 
revealed  numerous examples  of unethical or illegal  activity.  The reve- 
lations  of  indiscretion  and malfeasance  have been  shocking-at  least 
in their frequency,  even  if  the behavior  seems  quite unsurprising.  It 
are in categories 2 and 3; the additional  figure represents  category 4 loans reported 
separately  by the commerical  banking  industry  association. 
12. Bank of  International  Settlements, "The Maturity, Sectoral and Nationality 
Distribution  of International  Bank Lending," January  1998, pp. 12, 19. Data are for 
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appears that favored investors at securities firms were given guarantees 
of high positive rates of return on their equity portfolios (an embarrassed 
government continues to refuse to release the Nomura Securities  "VIP 
list,'  which includes politicians  and career bureaucrats). 13 Huge loans 
went  to  small  businesses  for  speculation  in real estate  and the  stock 
market,  as evidenced  by the infamous  bankruptcy of  small  restaurant 
owner Mrs. Onoue in Osaka, who defaulted on debts worth $3 billion, 
with  the  supposedly  staid  Industrial  Bank  of  Japan  as her  largest 
lender. 14 Large banks eagerly  introduced crooked clients  to subsidiary 
banks or credit cooperatives,  in order to keep  questionable  loans  off 
their own  books  while  hopefully  benefiting  from  the  illicit  business 
relationships  revealed  when  some  of  these  credit  cooperatives  went 
bankrupt.  15  Financial institutions and other corporations continued to pay 
off sokaiya (racketeers who threatened to reveal negative information at 
annual shareholder meetings).  Ministry of  Finance officials  gave banks 
advance warning of "surprise" inspections in exchange for lavish enter- 
tainment and other favors. 16 Those examinations were often perfunctory 
at best, enabling firms to hide imprudent, unethical, or illegal activities, 
as in the Daiwa Bank scandal in New York. 7 It has been alleged that the 
Ministry of Finance explicitly approved of-or  even gave administrative 
guidance recommending-illegal  schemes to hide financial problems at 
Yamaichi Securities. 18 And officers of the Bank of Japan have been im- 
plicated in providing advance information on the bank's market  operations 
13. See "The Weekly Post Special 3: TWP Obtains  Confidential  Document  from 
Nomura  Security  Fraud  Case," The Weekly  Post (Japan),  July 14, 1997; "Investigation 
Must Reach VIP Accounts," The Weekly  Post, September  22,  1997 (both articles ac- 
cessed on the worldwide  web). Because of the scandalous  nature  of this issue and the 
likelihood  that such VIP lists include prominent  bureaucrats  and politicians, reporting 
has been left mainly  to the sensationalist  weekly magazines. 
14.  "Osaka  Tea House Mistress  Onoue  Gets 12 Years  For  Her Extravagant  Fraud," 
Japan Digest,  March 3,  1998,  p. 2. 
15. The same was true of the jusen: "the banks  typically 'introduced'  to the jusen 
borrowers  that  the banks  themselves  couldn't touch, and in at least one case did so with 
clearly fraudulent  intent" ("HLAC Plans to Sue Four Banks That Got Jusen to Make 
Risky Loans," Japan  Digest, January  26,  1998, p. 1). 
16.  "MOF Bribery  Scandal  Reveals Backroom  Financial  Deals," Nikkei  Net, Jan- 
uary  27, 1998 (accessed  on the worldwide  web). 
17. "Banks Took MOF Inspectors  to Dutch Red Light District, Vegas Casinos," 
Japan  Digest, January  30, 1998, p. 2. 
18.  "Prosecutors  Raid Finance Ministry  Securities and Banking  Bureaus," Japan 
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to contacts in the private sector. 19  These scandals paint a picture of wide- 
spread routine corruption and incestuous relations among financial firms, 
their clients, government officials,  and politicians. 
In fact,  these colorful  anecdotes  are critical to the question  of how 
to deal with the banking crisis.  Bad debts may be the consequence  of 
an unanticipated drop in real estate values,  through no fault of the banks 
involved.  Or bad debts may result from unethical  or illegal  behavior. 
Japan is experiencing  a combination  of both problems.  Because  some 
banks and other financial institutions  behaved particularly egregiously 
during the past decade,  any reasonable solution to the current bad debt 
debacle  must involve  either closing  these institutions or (for those that 
may appear salvageable)  at least removing their management.  And the 
issue is further complicated by the complicity  of the Ministry of Finance 
in condoning,  encouraging,  or even recommending unethical and illegal 
actions by the banking sector. 
Responses 
Since  1994, the government of Japan has taken a number of measures 
to deal with the banking problem,  but as of mid-1998  these  had been 
insufficient.  It was a difficult challenge,  since the magnitude of the bad 
debts greatly  exceeded  that faced  by the U.S.  financial  system  in the 
1980s  and missteps  might lead to systemic  failure.  Nevertheless,  it is 
distressing  that in the five years since  the government  began to move 
on the issue,  the general perception among analysts is that the problem 
has become  worse.  Given that the existing  financial system was firmly 
rooted in Japanese social  patterns of long-term personal relationships, 
group solidarity,  and nontransparent connections,  it should not be sur- 
prising  that the government  moved  cautiously.  Equally  important are 
the  strong vested  interests  built  over  the past fifty  years-especially 
powerful  local  business  supporters  of  politicians  who  feared  that  a 
reformed  financial  sector  that engaged  in more rational allocation  of 
credit would  cut them off.  The government's  response  falls  into two 
categories:  an indirect approach through macroeconomic  stimulus and 
direct efforts  to bail out the banks. 
19.  "BOJ Exec Allegedly Gave Bankers  Advance Word  on Money Market  Opera- 
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One obvious  element of cleaning up the financial sector is to restore 
a positive  economic  growth path,  which  reduces  the probability  that 
existing  loans will  become  nonperforming and increases opportunities 
for  new  lending.  This  assumes  that macroeconomic  weakness  is  not 
caused by a credit crunch stemming from the bad debt and balance sheet 
weakness of the banking sector.20  There was some talk of a credit crunch 
in 1998,  but whether or not these allegations  were correct, such did not 
appear to be the case  earlier.  From 1992 through  1994,  the economy 
experienced a slowdown  in growth as a result of tighter monetary policy 
and the collapse of stock and real estate prices. With extensive  prodding 
from the domestic  business  sector and foreign  governments,  the Min- 
istry of  Finance  and politicians  supplied  fiscal  stimulus  in  1994  and 
1995-a  temporary cut in income taxes passed in 1994,  plus spending 
increases  in both years.  In consequence  the economy  finally  showed 
signs of recovery  in 1996,  expanding  at a strong rate of 3.9  percent. 
Sorting  out  what  is  happening  to  fiscal  policy  can be  particularly 
difficult for Japan. The basic  budget process  is fairly straightforward: 
the central government  formulates  an annual budget  for a fiscal  year 
running  from  April  through  the  following  March,  which  is  usually 
passed  by the Diet  in late March or early April.  This basic  budget  is 
generally  augmented by one or two supplementary budget bills  in the 
fall.  In the press,  though,  the government  publishes  flashy announce- 
ments of " stimulus packages, " which neither refer to the regular annual 
budget nor correspond in any strict sense  to developments  in the sup- 
plemental budgets.  These packages  include proposals for both tax and 
spending  measures  that do  become  incorporated  in  a supplemental 
budget  and miscellaneous  off-budget  measures  that may  or may  not 
have  any fiscal  meaning.  Therefore  a large  stimulus  package  can be 
very misleading  if it either contains  few  measures that actually  affect 
the fiscal balance  of  the government  or supplements  an initial budget 
that may have been very restrictive. 
Between  1992 and 1995,  the government announced seven  stimulus 
packages, as described in table 3. Taken at face value, these could have 
been supposed to expand the government deficit by 12 percent of GDP. 
Estimates of the actual stimulus,  or mamizu (clear water), amounted to 
a much lower 4.5  percent of GDP.  But even  this figure does  not take 
20.  For a strong  argument  supporting  this assumption,  see Posen (1998). 362  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1998 
Table  3. Fiscal Stimulus Packages  in Japan 
Percent,  except as indicated 
Advertised  package  Actual  stimulus 
Date  Amounta Share  of GDP  Share  of advertised  package  Share  of GDP 
Mar. 31, 1992  390  0.1  0.0  0.0 
Aug. 28, 1992  10,700  2.3  39.6  0.9 
Apr. 31, 1993  15,230  3.3  33.4  1.1 
Sep.  16, 1993  6,418  1.3  23.4  0.3 
Feb.  8, 1994  6,020  1.3  0.0  0.0 
Apr. 14, 1995  4,800  1.1  56.3  0.6 
Sep. 20, 1995  12,810  2.6  62.5  1.6 
Source: Posen (1998). 
a. Billions of yen. 
into account the four regular annual budgets of this period, to which 
the supplemental  measures  would be added. 
Because of the difficulties in sorting out announcements, supple- 
mental budgets, and annual  budgets, the only accurate  means of eval- 
uating fiscal stance is from the ex post general government balance. 
Figure  3 shows the actual  general  government  balance and  one estimate 
of  structural  change in the overall government balance. The actual 
balance shifted from a surplus  of over 3 percent  in 1991 to a deficit of 
4 percent in  1995 and 1996. The estimate of the structural  balance 
shifted from a surplus  of 1.5 percent  to a deficit of just under  4 percent 
in 1996, for a total movement of 5.5 percentage  points of GDP across 
five years (though  the estimate  of change in the structural  budget  deficit 
depends on the methodology used to determine  potential growth). 
But this injection of fiscal stimulus was suddenly  reversed in 1997. 
The Ministry  of Finance  chose, effective April 1, to end the income tax 
cut introduced  in 1994, increase the nationwide sales tax (from 3 per- 
cent to 5 percent), and raise other government  fees, including the co- 
payment  required  of individuals  in the national  health care system. As 
estimated in figure 3, the reduction  in the structural  deficit from fiscal 
1996 to fiscal 1997 was on the order  of 1.8 percentage  points of GDP, 
and this fiscal retrenchment  may have had an additional  negative psy- 
chological impact on households and businesses. Rather  than continu- 
ing a path of recovery, the economy was again relatively stagnant  in 
1997: 0.9 percent growth in the calendar  year and -0.2  for the fiscal 
year; and private sector forecasts for 1998 were all negative. The ap- Edward  J. Lincoln  363 
Figure 3. Japan's Government  Balance, 1988-97 
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parently strong performance  of  the economy  in  1996  may have  been 
exaggerated.  By midyear it was clear to the public that the consumption 
tax would rise in 1997; expectations  of higher taxes in the future led to 
increased housing investment and other purchases in the second half of 
the year. But the positive  impact of fiscal expansion  in 1995 and 1996 
and the negative  impact of retrenchment in 1997 strongly suggest  that 
the  current macroeconomic  problems  are the  result  of  fiscal  policy 
choices  in 1997 rather than weakness  in the banking sector. 
Macroeconomic  weakness,  by contrast, matters greatly to the finan- 
cial situation in Japan. A weak economy  produces more bad loans,  due 
to bankruptcies and further declines  in the price of real estate used as 
collateral for loans.  Banks are also affected  by stock market declines, 
since  they are permitted to hold up to 5 percent of  the shares of  any 
company  and therefore  have  large  stock  portfolios.  Large banks en- 
gaged in the international market are further affected  by stock market 364  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
declines,  because the capital adequacy ratio of the Bank of International 
Settlements  (BIS) permits them to include a percentage of the value of 
their stock holdings  in the capital base. 
Japanese banks have  also  argued that yen weakness-another  con- 
sequence  of  the  weak  macroeconomic  performance  of  the  economy 
(mainly through the increasing disparity between low domestic  interest 
rates and foreign  interest rates)-hurts  them by increasing  the size  of 
their foreign currency loans in yen-denominated terms. The government 
and the banking sector have been fixated on keeping major banks above 
the 8 percent BIS capital adequacy ratio standard for banks engaged  in 
international bank lending.  Since this is not a simple ratio of net worth 
to total assets,  an exchange  rate depreciation  inflates the yen-denomi- 
nated  value  of  total  assets  without  affecting  the  numerator; for  BIS 
purposes,  capital is measured as a bank's own equity capital plus sub- 
ordinated bonds,  reserves,  and 45 percent of unrealized gains on secu- 
rities holdings.21  But this concern is rather peculiar,  given the fact that 
yen depreciation has a positive  impact on the yen valuation of cash flow 
from investments  abroad. 
With the renewed downturn of the economy  after the spring of 1997, 
the  problems  of  the  financial  sector  increased.  The  government  has 
traditionally  preferred to deal with the failure of financial institutions 
quietly,  intervening  informally  to work out the takeover  of  a failing 
institution  by  a stronger one.  That appeared to  be  its  approach after 
1992.  Although a few small institutions (the seven jusen,  several credit 
cooperatives,  and  a  small  regional  bank)  were  permitted  to  declare 
outright bankruptcy, even these  small failures represented a departure 
from fifty years of government policy.  But in 1997, Nissan Life,  Sanyo 
Securities,  Yamaichi Securities,  and the midsized Hokkaido Takushoku 
Bank failed.  At this,  the press reported that market rules were in play 
and financial institutions  would have to sink or swim on their own.22 
Nevertheless,  in  the  wake  of  these  failures,  the  government  was 
under pressure to act to prevent an uncontrolled  rash of financial col- 
21.  See Ito and Szamosszegi (1998, p. 1  1). 
22.  See, for example, "Sanyo Goes Under;  Convoy System Ends," Asahi E-News, 
November  4,  1997 (accessed on the worldwide  web). Even in this case, something  of 
the traditional  approach  remained;  the MOF  forced  other  financial  institutions,  including 
the other major  securities firms, to contribute  to a rescue fund for paying back Sanyo 
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lapses.  Its  initial  strategy  combined  recapitalization  of  banks,  small 
regulatory moves to dress up balance sheets,  and measures to artificially 
prop up  stock  and real estate  values.  Early  in  1998  the Ministry  of 
Finance  designed,  and the Diet  passed,  a  Y 30 trillion  ($240  billion) 
bank bailout plan, of which  Y 17 trillion ($135  billion)  was to increase 
the  Deposit  Insurance Corporation's  fund to  reimburse depositors  of 
insolvent  banks  and  Y 13  trillion  ($103  billion)  was  to  recapitalize 
banks through the purchase of new issues  of preferred shares and sub- 
ordinated bonds. Deciding  that capital adequacy ratios are an inherently 
sensible  concept,  the Ministry of Finance announced a weaker,  4 per- 
cent  adequacy  ratio for domestic  banks not involved  in international 
lending, effective  from spring 1998, but meeting even this standard was 
sufficiently  difficult  for so  many banks that,  at the end of  1997,  the 
ministry indicated that enforcement  would be "flexible."23 
While recapitalizing  banks is a necessary part of fixing the problems 
of the financial sector,  the specific  approach adopted by the Japanese 
government  in  early  1998  presents  three  problems  that have  raised 
skepticism  about the wisdom  or practicality of the policy.  First, prop- 
ping up weak banks with government  funds injects  moral hazard, es- 
pecially since access to these funds was not made contingent on changes 
in management personnel.  As  noted above,  some  of these banks have 
particularly weak  or dishonest  management.  This  became  a political 
issue,  as  the  public  appeared unwilling  to  have  its  money  spent  on 
a  recapitalization  scheme  that  would  protect  negligent  or  dishonest 
managers. 
Second,  an infusion  of  government  money  might  further enhance 
moral hazard because the government would be extremely unwilling  to 
permit recipient banks to fail-and  thereby suffer embarassment or loss 
of face.  This dilemma has already arisen in the debate over what to do 
with the Long Term Credit Bank (LTCB).  The bank received  an infu- 
sion of capital in early  1998,  as the government  attempted to force  a 
reluctant Sumitomo Trust to absorb the LTCB,  once bad loans had also 
been stripped out.  Having  already poured money  into the LTCB,  the 
government appeared to prefer to add more money,  rather than letting 
the bank declare bankruptcy. 
23.  "MOF to Ease Implementation  of Banking  Rules Set for April," Nikkei  Net, 
December  23, 1997 (accessed on the worldwide  web); "To Avoid More Bankruptcies, 
MOF  Eases New Capital  Rules for Banks," Japan Digest, January  6,  1998, p. 2. 366  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
Third, the government proceeded without knowledge  of which banks 
were in greatest need of a capital infusion,  or else  it was unwilling  to 
put the money  where  it was  needed  most,  out of  fear of  alerting the 
public as to which  banks were in greatest difficulty.  This continued  a 
pattern of patronizing behavior that assumed the public was not capable 
of responding rationally to accurate information.  That is,  the Japanese 
government worried that the public might interpret an infusion  of new 
capital not as a sign of the increased  safety  of a bank, but as a signal 
that the bank was in such bad condition  that it would fail,  thus leading 
to a catastrophic withdrawal of deposits. 
In actuality,  only  the  largest  twenty-one  banks  in  Japan received 
funds, through issues  of preferred shares and subordinated bonds total- 
ing  Y2.1  trillion  ($15  billion)  in March  1998,  reportedly enough  to 
raise the BIS capital ratio of the nine  "city"  banks (nationwide  com- 
mercial banks) by  about  1 percentage  point.24 One wonders  whether, 
rather than to rescue the banking system,  the real intent was to ensure 
that the large banks would  not lose  their ability to make international 
loans  (and perhaps also  to bring down  the embarrassing  "Japan pre- 
mium" in international interbank lending).  Because of these doubts and 
criticisms,  the rest of  the  Y 13 trillion  earmarked for capital  infusion 
still had not been disbursed by the fall of  1998. 
In early  1998 the government  sought additional means to assist the 
banks.  Since  banks  are affected  by  movements  in the  stock  market, 
such measures included propping up stock market prices.  A portion of 
social  security  funds,  postal  saving  funds,  and postal  life  insurance 
funds is routed through two subsidiary organizations of the government 
with  a mandate to  make  portfolio  investments  in the private  sector. 
Roughly  14 percent of  social  security  funds are routed to the Nenkin 
Fukushi  Jigyodan  (public  welfare  service  public  corporation,  or 
PWSPC),  and 2.5  percent  of  postal  savings  and  11 percent of  postal 
life  insurance funds  are routed to the Kan'i  Hoken Fukushi Jigyodan 
(postal  life  insurance welfare  corporation,  or PLIWC).25 The  govern- 
24.  "Top Japanese  Banks Set Out Plans for Public Funds Injection," Nikkei  Net, 
March  5, 1998 (accessed on the worldwide  web); "Public Funds  Will Raise Banks' BIS 
Ratios 1%,  but That  May Not Be Enough," Japan Digest, March  6, 1998, p. 2. 
25.  In FY1994, the PLIWC managed Y9  trillion ($90 billion at 1994 exchange 
rates) in postal life insurance  funds, representing  11 percent  of postal life funds, and 
Y5  trillion ($49 billion) in postal savings funds, representing  2.5  percent of postal Edward  J. Lincoln  367 
ment-owned organizations  then place these funds with financial insti- 
tutions to engage in portfolio investment. The funds can be quietly 
invested in weak financial  institutions  or used to prop  up overall stock 
market  prices-dubbed  by the Japanese  media a PKO (price-keeping 
operation). In mid-March  1998, for example, the Liberal Democratic 
Party  (LDP) agreed  to use up to Y 1.3 trillion (just over $10 billion) in 
postal savings funds to prop up the stock market  during  the remainder 
of the month.26  Moreover, in early 1998 the Ministry of Finance im- 
posed stringent  controls on short selling in the stock market, with the 
obvious intent of reducing  downward  pressure  on share  prices.27 
Other policy measures involved changes in accounting that made 
bank balance sheets look healthier  than they were in reality. Japanese 
firms  have traditionally  shown assets at purchase  cost on their balance 
sheets, thus injecting an element of unreality to accounting results. 
Under new rules, financial institutions revalued real estate holdings 
(mainly the long-held land on which their offices and branches  sit) to 
market  value in 1998, but were not required  to do likewise with their 
stock portfolios;  many financial  institutions  hold shares  purchased  near 
the peak of the stock market  and have been permitted  to keep these 
assets listed at their original high purchase  prices, rather  than marking 
them down to current  value.28 
Finally, the government  has discussed using public funds to buy real 
estate and thereby  prop up land prices or buy asset-backed  securities, 
representing  the bad  debts  of banks, at above-market  prices.29  But while 
the government  might be able to generate  a small change in land prices 
by accelerating  purchases  of land for future  public works projects, this 
cannot  continue in the long run. 
This set of policies can be described  as an effort to continue a tra- 
savings funds. For the same period, PWSPC  data show that it managed Y 21 trillion 
($200 billion) of social security  funds, or roughly 14 percent  of social security funds. 
These data  are from the annual  financial  statements  of the respective  organizations. 
26.  "Public Funds to Be Used to Buoy Stocks," Asahi  E-News,  March 13, 1998 
(accessed  on the worldwide  web). 
27.  "MOF  Will Tighten  Control  on Short  Selling to Prop  Up Share  Prices," Japan 
Digest,  January  8, 1998, p. 2. 
28.  "LDP Would Have Government  Buy Mortgage-Backed  Securities at Above- 
Market  Values," Japan Digest,  February  11, 1998, p. 2. 
29.  "LDP Would Have Government  Buy Mortgage-Backed  Securities at Above- 
Market  Values," Japan Digest,  February  11, 1998, p. 2. 368  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
ditional approach. Banks were protected from failure, while it was 
hoped  that  a rise in stock and  real estate prices would eventually  reduce 
losses on bad loans. Meanwhile, the government  expected public con- 
fidence (and deposits) in commercial banks to rise,  in light of  the 
implicit guarantee  of an end to bank failures, infusion of government 
capital, and reinforced  deposit insurance  funds. Unfortunately,  these 
policies did not have the expected outcomes. Rather than restoring 
public confidence  they appear  to have eroded  it, as rumors  about  banks 
on the verge of collapse continued. Given the failures of bank man- 
agement, it should not be surprising  that policies to prop up banks 
indiscriminately  and leave management  untouched would be viewed 
skeptically. 
Households have a risk-free alternative  to commercial  banks in the 
form of the postal savings system, and deposits have gradually  shifted 
toward  this option. From  fiscal 1994 through  fiscal 1996 (ending  March 
1997) total deposits in commercial banks were almost flat, whereas 
deposits in postal savings continued  to increase,  raising  its share  in total 
domestic deposits from 29 percent  to 32 percent.30  During fiscal 1997, 
deposits in commercial  banks  actually  rose by about  2 percent,  but they 
still fell behind  the 11.4 percent  gain in postal savings deposits.3'  While 
these data do not support  the popular  view of a major  flight of money 
out of commercial  bank accounts  into postal savings, there  has been at 
least a modest shift in the relative share of funds invested as postal 
savings, suggesting  that  the public  does not entirely  believe government 
promises to avoid bank failures and is drifting slowly toward safer 
assets. 
Faced with continuing  criticism  of its banking  policies, the Japanese 
government announced  a new plan at the beginning of July 1998, a 
close variant  of which should pass the Diet in the fall. This plan in- 
cluded several proposals:  creating  a secondary  market  for the securiti- 
zation of bad loans; further  tightening  accounting  rules to more closely 
conform to those used by the U.S.  Securities and Exchange Commis- 
sion; strengthening  bank supervision  through  the new Financial  Super- 
visory Agency (created  in June 1998 and officially independent  of the 
Ministry  of Finance), which was to begin an intense inspection of the 
30.  Bank of Japan  (1997, pp. 57, 190). 
31.  Bank  of Japan  (1997, p. 57) for  commercial  banks;  "Postal  Savings  Rose 11.4%, 
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major  banks;  and  creation  of the "bridge  bank" system. Of the various 
initiatives, the most important  is the bridge bank concept, involving a 
new mechanism  to handle failed banks. Under the proposal, a failed 
bank  would be placed  under  a government-appointed  receiver, who was 
to arrange  an acquisition. Should  that  effort not suffice, the failed bank 
would become a bridge bank under government  control. As such, it 
would continue to make loans to "sound" borrowers,  dispose of bad 
loans, receive equity funds from the Y 13 trillion fund established  for 
bank  capitalization  in early 1998, and  continue  to seek a takeover  bank 
for its remaining  assets. Bridge  banks  may exist for two years, with the 
possibility of extensions for three additional  years.32 
In proposing  a mechanism  for dealing  with the consequences  of bank 
failure  rather  than  relying on ad hoc methods,  the government  has taken 
a useful step forward. Nevertheless, the proposed  plan (as under dis- 
cussion in the summer  of 1998) has a number  of potential  problems. 
First, it does little to allay suspicions that the government's  goal is 
to prevent  the failure of any bank. Even though the FSA is to engage 
in stringent  inspection of banks and, presumably,  to close those that 
are  clearly insolvent, markets  are not convinced  that  it will do so. Early 
statements  by the new government  of Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi 
fueled this skepticism  by emphasizing  a "soft landing,"'  in which few, 
if any, banks  would be closed.33  And it was reported  that an early draft 
of the legislation relied on banks to declare insolvency voluntarily.34 
This drift in policy is distressing, given the need to eliminate irrespon- 
sible, insolvent institutions  and their managers. 
Second, the emphasis in the bridge bank plan is on continuing the 
provision  of loans  to "sound" borrowers.  In Japan's  relationship-heavy 
banking sector, the rationale for this bias is to alleviate a potential 
credit crunch-even  creditworthy  borrowers  whose traditional  lender 
has failed might experience trouble in finding another  bank to extend 
credit. Understandable  as this goal is, suspicion remains that the real 
outcome  will be the continued  flow of credit to borrowers  who are not 
creditworthy,  especially those with connections to LDP politicians. 
32.  Japan,  Government-Ruling  Party  Conference  (1998). 
33.  "Obuchi,  Miyazawa  Agree to Aim for 'Soft Landing'  in Bank  Sector Reform," 
Nikkei  Net, July 30, 1998 (accessed on the worldwide  web). 
34.  "Bridge Bank Bills to Require  Banks' Self-Declaration  of Collapse," Nikkei 
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Such lending may be extensive, so that the bridge bank plan could 
hinder  rather  than  promote  the broader  structural  changes needed  in the 
economy. Suspicion of this aspect of the plan by opposition political 
parties  could delay or obstruct  passage of the necessary implementing 
legislation. 
Indeed, even though there may be some theoretical  justification  for 
the existence of a credit crunch  resulting  from balance sheet weakness 
and financial  institution  bankruptcies,  the actual situation  remains  un- 
clear. In the spring and summer  of 1998, bank lending was running  at 
slightly more than 2 percent below year-earlier  levels.35 But whether 
this reflects  more  than  the result  of macroeconomic  weakness  is difficult 
to discern. At the very least, this small decline in the magnitude  of 
lending seems at odds with the conventional  wisdom in Japan  that the 
country  is experiencing  a widespread  credit crunch. 
Third,  although  the government's  intent  was to impress  markets  with 
a newfound resolve to attack the bad debt problem quickly, the plan 
permits  the shutdown  of individual  banks to take place over consider- 
able length of time. The maximum  period of initial supervision by a 
government-appointed  receiver is  not defined, and the subsequent 
bridge  bank  could remain  in existence for up to five years. Rather  than 
tackling the real problems of bad debts and insolvent banks, the plan 
suggests an intent to delay their resolution  as long as possible. 
It seemed probable  that some version of the bridge  bank  plan would 
pass in the fall of 1998. Having suffered a decisive loss of seats in the 
upper  house of the Diet in an election in July, the Liberal  Democratic 
Party  appeared  to be willing to compromise  with the opposition  parties 
in designing the legislation. But it is unlikely that any concessions 
would really address  the plan's basic flaws.36 
Evaluation 
The scale of the problems  in Japan's  financial  sector far exceeds the 
U.S.  savings and loan (S&L) crisis of the 1980s. Under the best of 
35.  Jeffrey D. Young and Tomoko Fujii, "Economic and Market  Analysis; Japan: 
Issues and Prospects," Salomon  Smith Barney, August 13, 1998, p. 6. 
36.  See Robert Alan Feldman, "Japan:  Shallows, Miseries, and Brinkmanship," 
Morgan  Stanley  Dean Witter  Global  Economic  Forum, September  8, 1998 (accessed on 
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circumstances, the cleanup will be costly, and will involve a combi- 
nation  of closing the worst banks, shoring  up other  banks  with govern- 
ment capital, and disposing of  nonperforming  loans throughout  the 
banking system. Since systemic risk is certainly present, choice of 
policy is especially important.  Over  the next several years, the govern- 
ment is likely to avoid an uncontrolled  collapse of the financial  system. 
Certainly, the vast scale of the Japanese  banking  crisis might suggest 
that a policy of caution and slowness is justified. But there are several 
reasons why its ability to resolve these problems in a manner that 
restores  the sector to health  remains  in doubt, notwithstanding  the new 
bridge bank  plan. 
First, too much emphasis is still placed on propping  up all financial 
institutions, regardless  of their past behavior  or current  financial  con- 
dition. But if the public does not believe that this is either desirable  or 
possible, the government  will lack the political support  needed to do 
so. The public might also continue to vote with its pocketbook, dem- 
onstrating its lack of  faith in the government's promise of  blanket 
support  to financial institutions through  the continued leakage of de- 
posits to the postal savings system. Moreover, as emphasized above, 
the banking system needs both a bailout and the elimination of the 
banks  and managers  most culpable  in the unethical  and illegal dealings 
of the past decade. 
Second, the macroeconomic  situation  has not improved  much over 
the course of 1998. In April 1998 the government  announced  a Y 16 
trillion ($114 billion) fiscal stimulus  package, which at face value rep- 
resented  3 percent  of GDP, larger  than  any previous  package. However, 
skeptical  analysts  pegged the real portion  of this package at about Y 7 
trillion  for fiscal 1998, or just over 1 percent  of GDP.37  Moreover, the 
government  had actually begun the fiscal year with an initial budget 
that would have withdrawn  fiscal stimulus from the economy, further 
dampening  the net change in fiscal stance from fiscal 1997, once the 
supplementary  measures  were added  to the initial budget. In the fall of 
1998, the Obuchi government appeared  likely to propose additional 
stimulus, including a permanent  income tax cut (although  this would 
not take  effect until fiscal 1999). These measures  should  keep the reces- 
37.  Robert  Alan Feldman  puts the fiscal impact  of this package  at Y 7.4 trillion  for 
FY98, and an additional  Y 1.7 trillion spread  over subsequent  years; "Japan  Struggles 
to Stay Stagnant,"  memorandum,  Morgan  Stanley Dean Witter,  May 1998, p. 9. 372  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
sion from deepening, but most forecasters  anticipate  that the economy 
will shrink  in 1998 and remain  sluggish through  1999. In this environ- 
ment, the stock and real estate markets  are unlikely to rise. It would be 
unrealistic  to expect that the problems  in the financial  sector will ease 
because of rising capital adequacy  ratios from higher stock prices, or 
better  chances of loan recovery due to higher real estate prices. 
Third, a longer term  perspective  also suggests that real estate prices 
may not rise much from present levels. Japan  has experienced a low 
and falling birth  rate for more than  two decades. In 1997 the birth  rate 
hit a low of 1.39 children  expected over the lifetime of each woman.38 
Total population  is now expected to peak in 2008, and  the total number 
of households will quite possibly peak earlier. In Japan, many single 
adults live either in company dormitories  or in their parents' homes. 
Most marry  between the ages of twenty-five  and twenty-nine, at which 
point they become new households, needing housing. Figure 4 shows 
what will happen  to the absolute size of this segment of the population 
over the next twenty-five  years (under  the generous  assumption  of zero 
mortality  of all persons  now aged  between  zero and  twenty-eight).  From 
2001 until the end of the period, this segment of the population  will 
shrink;  the total decline in absolute size between 1996 and 2021 will 
be 35 percent. Therefore  the housing component  of real estate demand 
should become flat or start  to decline in the near future. Clearly, one 
cannot rely on the recovery of the real estate market  over the medium 
term as a means of overcoming  the bad loan problem. 
Nevertheless, there have been a few positive developments. First, 
some steps have taken  place to securitize  bad debt, principally  through 
sales to American financial firms. In the ten months ending June 30, 
1998, foreign investors acquired  loans with face value of  Y4 trillion 
($29 billion) at prices reported  to range from 5 to 10 percent of face 
value.39  This should contribute  to the removal of nonperforming  loans 
from  banks'  books, although  the amounts  involved so far  are  very small 
relative to the total of bad loans in the system. Even this strategy  may 
run into some problems, however. The price at which purchasers  are 
willing to pick up bad loans may continue to be very low because of 
38.  "Birth Rate Hits Another Record Low, As Women Marry Later, Divorce 
More," Japan Digest,  July 11, 1998, p. 5. 
39.  "Foreigners  Scoop up Y4 Trillion in Bad Loans at Bargain  Basement  Rates," 
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the greater  doubt  that  land  prices will recover  substantially  from current 
levels, for the reasons noted above. Furthermore,  to foreclose on bad 
loans and sell the real estate collateral is very difficult in Japan, both 
because of the poorly developed nature  of real estate markets, which 
are encumbered  with strong tenant  rights and high transactions  taxes, 
and because of the involvement  of yakuza (Japanese  mafia) gangsters. 
Nevertheless, the very recent emergence of a market  for selling bad 
debt is a positive step, and the participation  of foreign institutions  in 
developing this market  could increase pressure  to sell the underlying 
real estate collateral. 
In addition,  the problems  of the financial  sector have become suffi- 
ciently urgent that the government appears to have lost its general 
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was virtually unthinkable  that an American  financial  institution  could 
acquire  a Japanese  firm. But over the past year, there  have been several 
visible transactions:  Merrill Lynch has acquired  retail branches  from 
defunct Yamaichi Securities, GE Capital has purchased  several small 
finance  firms, and  Travelers  has acquired  what  appears  to be a minority 
but de facto controlling interest in Nikko Securities.40  A long-term 
solution to the problems  of the financial sector will involve major  re- 
structuring,  and  competition  from  foreign  institutions  provides  substan- 
tial incentive for domestic firms  to change. 
Another part of the long-term solution is a basic move away from 
heavily bank-centered  finance. That  trend  may be underway  with rising 
issues of corporate  bonds in 1997 and 1998. The fact that bond issues 
are increasing  rapidly  also suggests that  concerns  about  a credit  crunch 
are overdone;  large creditworthy  firms  that might be facing constraints 
from bank lenders appear  to be substituting  bonds for loans. 
Conclusion 
Japan's  financial  problems  are very serious and have been festering 
for eight years since the peak of the stock market  bubble. The govern- 
ment's initial attempts  to pursue  a traditional  quiet, opaque  solution  by 
providing  guidance  for absorbing  failed institutions  into strong  ones is 
entirely  understandable.  No one understood  the magnitude  of the prob- 
lem, and this approach  had worked well in previous decades. With a 
paucity of strong institutions willing to bend to Ministry of Finance 
pressures, though, the possibility of uncontrollable  strings of failures 
has grown and, in turn, has generated  a demand  for stronger  policies. 
The plans that emerged over the summer  of 1998 respond  to that de- 
mand. But even these have attracted  considerable  skepticism. Some of 
this skepticism is warranted.  The plans have some structural  flaws and 
are certainly  vulnerable  to arbitrary  and politically motivated  decision- 
40.  "Bank  of Tokyo-Mitsubishi  Fails in First  Round  of Big Bang," Asahi  Shimbun, 
July 1, 1998 (accessed on the worldwide  web); "GE Capital  To Buy 80%  of Mitsubishi 
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making  that  might  not be in the best interest  of cleaning  up the financial 
mess. And any plausible solution to Japan's financial problems will 
come at considerable  cost to taxpayers, who are justifiably concerned 
that their money may be spent on propping up the wrong banks for 
political reasons. Comment 
and Discussion 
Benjamin M.  Friedman: Not so many years ago, my Harvard  col- 
league Ezra Vogel wrote a best-selling book with the arresting  title 
Japan as Number  One. The notion  accurately  captured  the popular  view 
of Japan  at the time, and it also reflected the considered  opinion of a 
sizable fraction  of the knowledgeable  scholarly  community,  as the west- 
ern world fretted over its ability to compete successfully against the 
myriad advantages  (as they then seemed) that the Japanese  economy 
enjoyed. Today, Professor Vogel's sequel might be called something 
like Japan as Number Twenty-Seven-or  maybe some even larger number. 
Nowhere has this about-face in attitudes  toward Japan  been more 
striking  than in the financial  arena. People all over the world still buy 
Sony radios, Toyota automobiles, and Seiko watches. Japan's manu- 
facturers  have increasing cost problems, to be sure, but these are no 
worse (and probably  a lot less severe) than those of their counterparts 
in other mature industrial  economies. By contrast, the once vaunted 
Japanese  financial  system, which "revisionist" thinkers  hailed for cre- 
ating so many  competitive  advantages  for Japanese  industry,  and  which 
even mainstream  western economists closely studied as a consistent 
provider of lower cost capital, is now widely perceived as a cripple 
standing in the way of any serious prospect for Japan's economic re- 
covery. Watching in the newspapers  the steady climb of official esti- 
mates of the volume of bad loans on the books of Japanese  banks, as 
the Ministry  of Finance  keeps revising  its figures  upward,  is reminiscent 
of the changing  cost estimates  of major  weapons systems bought  by the 
U.S. Defense Department  under  the old cost-plus procurement  system. 
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How did this astonishing turnaround  take place? Was it merely an 
accident  triggered  by the bubble  in Japanese  real  estate  and  stock  prices? 
Or was Japan's financial  system fundamentally  flawed to begin with? 
As a matter  of public policy, was excessive supervision  and regulation 
a major  part  of the problem?  Or, as in the case of the U.S. savings and 
loan debacle, was the problem too little supervision and regulation? 
Most important,  looking forward,  what should Japanese  public policy 
do now to clean up the mess and get the economy growing again? 
Edward  Lincoln argues  that, over time, Japan's  economy underwent 
structural  changes  that  left its idiosyncratic  and inflexible financial  sys- 
tem increasingly  far behind. He therefore  largely sidesteps the question 
of whether  this system was optimal, or even useful, in the conditions 
that prevailed  during  the first  quarter  century  or so after  World  War  II. 
(There  is some literature,  including  research  by David Sharfstein,  David 
Weinstein, Yishay Yafeh and others, suggesting that it was not.) His 
point is instead  that  the international  competitive  environment  changed 
in the 1970s and 1980s, and  the Japanese  financial  system was not well 
suited to contribute  to the functioning  of the Japanese  economy under 
the newly prevailing  circumstances.  Following a highly useful review 
of the resulting mismatch  between the financial system and the econ- 
omy, he concludes in short, that "this combination of factors was 
almost guaranteed  to lead to problems." 
While Lincoln argues, therefore, that  the problems  Japan  now faces 
in this sphere reflect endemic flaws, not just the accident of the asset 
price bubble, he does point to the collapse of Japanese  stock and real 
estate prices as the immediate trigger for what went wrong. His ac- 
counting of the volume of nonperforming  loans, including not only 
those at the banks but also the questionable  assets of insurance  com- 
panies and securities firms, confirms  the widespread  belief that Japan 
now faces a significantly larger problem compared  to the size of its 
economy than  the United States did at the height of the S&L collapse. 
What  he does not say, but is presumably  true, is that Japan's  problem 
is larger  in yet another  way, because of how far real estate prices have 
fallen. The U.S. Resolution  Trust  Corporation  (RTC), which liquidated 
over 700 savings and loan institutions, eventually realized-through 
repayments  and  the sale of the collateral  that  it seized-nearly  80 cents 
on the dollar  of the total portfolio of loans and other assets that it took 
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S&Ls that  together  had  over $400 billion of assets on their  books at the 
time they were taken over.  ' The RTC's recovery rate even on the real 
estate  it sold was apparently  in the range of 60 cents on the dollar. In 
Japan,  realizations  from  sale of real  estate assets at today's prices  would 
surely fall well below the RTC's experience. 
Although Lincoln never says it in so many words, he seems to 
think-and  I agree-that  as in the U.S.  savings and loan situation, 
Japanese  banks ran into problems  not because they had too much reg- 
ulation and supervision  but because they had too little, or at least too 
little in the right places. He usefully notes the absence or weakness of 
restrictions  on the banks' entry into new and unfamiliar  areas  like real 
estate development  and foreign lending in the 1980s. He also catalogs 
the laxness or outright  corruption  of supervisory  attention  to nonper- 
forming loans, once these began to accumulate. He might also have 
noted, in this regard,  the contrast  between the United States, which at 
last count had over 9,000 full-time bank examiners on the payroll of 
the Federal  Reserve System, the Comptroller  of the Currency,  and  other 
federal regulatory  bodies, as well as state-level banking  agencies, and 
Japan, which has less than 300, of whom many are poorly trained  and 
many others work in revolving-door  relationships  with the banks that 
they are supposed  to supervise. To be sure, Japan  has far fewer banks. 
But the relevant measure for this purpose is not the number  of banks 
but the number  and complexity of loans. As Lincoln emphasizes, bank 
loans bulk far larger  in the Japanese  economy than  in the United States. 
A more fundamental  issue, which bears not only on how Japan's 
current  distressed economic and financial situation arose but also on 
what to do about it, turns on the connection between macroeconomic 
weakness and an incapacitated  credit system. Lincoln argues that Ja- 
pan's macroeconomic  weakness today is due not to any kind of credit 
crunch  but to other factors, primarily  contractionary  fiscal policy. He 
therefore  goes on to argue  that  the best way to help the Japanese  banks 
is to get the economy growing again. His analysis thus stands  in direct 
opposition to the view that the best way to lift the Japanese  economy 
out of its current  situation  is to get the banks lending again. While I do 
1. The more familiar estimate of  $155 billion as the cost of the S&L clean-up 
includes  this sum for the RTC  plus another  $70 billion dispersed  by the Federal  Savings 
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not want to overstate the difference of opinion, I do disagree with 
Lincoln here. 
I certainly accept the view that contractionary  fiscal policy is re- 
sponsible for a major  part  of Japan's  weak economic performance  over 
the past half dozen years. As Adam  Posen effectively argues  in his new 
book, expansionary  fiscal policy has not worked  in Japan  because it has 
not been tried-and  to the limited extent that it was tried, in 1995, it 
did work.2  But macroeconomic  phenomena  that occur on a large scale 
and  that  persist  for the better  part  of a decade  rarely  have unique  causes, 
and Japan's stagnation  in the 1990s is no exception. By now, Japan's 
economic decline recalls the early nineteenth  century  story in which a 
paddle steamer  puts in at a Hudson River village, boards passengers, 
splashes  off again  to great  applause  by the assembled  crowd, disappears 
around  the next river  bend . . . and  promptly  sinks. Why  did  the disaster 
occur, one is led to ask? Alas, we shall never know: there were too 
many survivors. 
Over the past ten years, the Brookings Panel has heard numerous 
papers  outlining the ways in which the extension of credit facilitates 
production,  unemployment, investment, and consumption-and  con- 
versely, how a dysfunctional credit system can impede nonfinancial 
activity. Whether  Japan's  economic downturn  caused the banks' credit 
problems  or a credit  crunch  that  arose  for other  reasons  (most  obviously, 
the popping  of the asset price bubble)  caused the downturn  is a chicken 
and egg problem that will probably occupy researchers  for years to 
come. But by now the two are mutually  reinforcing. As Joe Peek and 
Eric Rosengren, among others, have shown, if the situation in Japan 
today does not constitute a credit crunch, it at least looks very much 
like one. Restoring economic growth, through fiscal policy as both 
Lincoln and Posen suggest, or through  monetary  policy as Paul Krug- 
man's paper  in this volume suggests, would clearly help to restore  the 
health of Japanese  bank balance sheets and, in turn, the viability of 
Japan's  credit provision mechanism. But independent  steps to rebuild 
the banking  and credit system would also help to foster renewed eco- 
nomic growth. 
What  might those steps be? More specifically, does the bridge bank 
plan recently proposed  by the Ministry  of Finance offer a real chance 
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of doing the job? The experience of the Resolution Trust Corporation 
in the United States  offers several  highly useful lessons for Japan.  First, 
and most important,  delay is costly. Research  after the fact (for exam- 
ple, by David Ely and  Nikhil Varaiya)  has shown  that  the most powerful 
factor determining  the per dollar cost of resolving the insolvencies of 
individual  institutions  was the number  of months  that elapsed between 
the identification  of an insolvency and its resolution. 
Second, the negative effect of collateral sales on real estate prices 
was mostly less than  market  participants  had feared. In some local and 
regional markets, there even appears  to have been a beneficial effect 
from eliminating the widely perceived "overhang" of assets held by 
the RTC and due for sale. This experience reinforces the first lesson, 
in that it undercuts  one of the standard  arguments  for delay. 
Third, eliminating insolvent institutions improves the competitive 
environment  for those that  survive. The reason  is that  insolvency, even 
when not formally recognized, greatly magnifies  the familiar  perverse 
incentives created  by moral  hazard  under  limited shareholder  liability. 
The lesson to be drawn  here is that regulatory  forbearance  is counter- 
productive.  Once again, moving forward  forcefully and rapidly  is war- 
ranted. 
Finally, one of the greatest  successes of the U.S. experience in this 
regard was that the government  did not have to go into the banking 
business on an ongoing basis. One of the chief concerns  that  observers 
of Japanese  policy have expressed about the MOF's new bridge bank 
plan is that it explicitly authorizes  government  ownership  and manage- 
ment of any failed banks for up to five years. In the event, might five 
become seven, and then seven become ten? The U.S.  government  has 
also, in effect, owned and managed  banks in recent years: Continental 
Illinois in the mid-1980s, Bank  of New England  in the early 1990s. But 
the cases are few, the government  clearly saw its ownership  as tempo- 
rary-which  in the event it was-and  it left management  squarely in 
the hands of private  sector professionals whom it appointed. 
Can Japan carry out an effective program  to clean up the balance 
sheets of its banks, eliminate  unsound  institutions,  and  restore  its credit 
system to a condition  that  will support  rather  than  impede  more general 
economic recovery?  Of course it can. Japan  remains  a rich country  by 
any standard,  and the public resources  needed to recapitalize  the bank- 
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sense the losses have already  been incurred,  and  the wasted  resources- 
since that is what loan losses ultimately represent-are  already gone. 
The loss of wealth represented  by the decline of real estate and stock 
prices has already  occurred.  It remains  simply to recognize that  all this 
is so and move forward.  In a Robinson  Crusoe  model, or the multiper- 
son equivalent that economists conventionally call a representative 
agent model, there would be no reason whatever  for not doing so. 
But the current  impasse  in Japan  represents  a spectacular  example  of 
the failure of Robinson Crusoe, or representative  agent, thinking as 
applied  to matters  of actual  economic policy. In this case, recognizing 
the losses that have already  occurred  means closing down, or at least 
restructuring,  key institutions. That presumably  means expropriating 
shareholders  and, what is apparently  more problematic  in the Japanese 
context, identifying specific individuals as responsible for their insti- 
tutions' failure and removing  them. Nothing clears the air more effec- 
tively than for the shareholders  of an insolvent bank to be told the 
truth-namely,  that  the value of their  investment  is zero. Nothing  better 
teaches the importance  of good performance  on the job than to see 
blatantly poor performers  suffer the consequences personally, rather 
than continue to reap rewards,  as is so often the case. 
To an outsider,  Japan  appears  to be the kind  of homogeneous  society 
that, in principle, ought to be able to take difficult decisions and move 
forward.  Such, however, is not the case. A puzzling question, from a 
political economy perspective, is what internal  social tension prevents 
the Japanese  from moving effectively to resolve these problems. But 
that is clearly the subject for another  paper. 
General discussion: Participants  engaged in spirited  discussion about 
whether  radical  or gradual  remedies  should  be applied  to Japan's  bank- 
ing problem. Alan Blinder observed that differences in cultural and 
economic conditions made it difficult to use U.S.-style  remedies in 
Japan.  He noted that the disappearance  of Yamaichi Securities was a 
much bigger shock to Japanese  confidence than the disappearance  of 
Smith Barney, or even Merrill  Lynch, would be here. Because bank- 
ruptcy  is much harder  to accept in Japan, a strategy  of closing down 
technically  insolvent  banks  would have to be implemented  slowly, and 
so would delay the return  of a normally  functioning  banking system. 
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if Japan adopted a softer approach, keeping dead institutions alive 
through infusions of capital and new management, or mergers with 
good institutions.  George Akerlof added  that  it was dangerous  to apply 
U.S.  experience with the Resolution Trust Corporation  directly, be- 
cause Japan's  problem  is so much bigger, and because banks  play such 
a key role in the Japanese  financial  system. The resolution  of the S&L 
crisis had little, if any, impact on asset prices, and the RTC realized 
70 to 80 percent  of loan values when it sold properties.  He worried  that 
a radical  approach  to the problem  of failed banks in Japan  might make 
the current  situation  worse by driving  down asset values, and so add to 
the problems  of all institutions. He concluded that it was important  to 
proceed slowly with bank reform. Charles Schultze reasoned that the 
huge size of Japan's  financial  problem  relative  to the size of its economy 
forced a trade-off between growth and reform. Since many present 
managers  would have to be replaced  in any radical  reform  of the bank- 
ing system, reform  would risk impeding  recovery. Since the short-term 
priority should be to get the economy growing again, he therefore 
believed that reform  should be gradual. 
Martin  Baily disagreed  with these calls for caution. He argued  that 
Japan  needed fundamental  structural  reform  that would replace its tra- 
ditional approach  to doing business and lending money with one that 
was oriented  to market  pricing  and  shareholder  value. He acknowledged 
that the Japanese  economy had enormous  success in the early postwar 
decades, but  questioned  whether  the system had  served  Japan  well more 
recently, even before the present crisis. He pointed out that Japanese 
growth slowed dramatically  in the 1970s; at that time, GDP per hour 
worked was about one-half of the U.S. level, and it has since reached 
only about 60 percent  of the U.S. level. Baily reasoned  that Japan  has 
missed many investment  and growth opportunities  because of the way 
banking  and business are organized. Specifically, he cited the need to 
develop and apply risk assessment skills in the banking  system, where 
making the required  shift may, in many cases, mean changes in lead- 
ership positions in banking  and commerce. 
Barry  Bosworth recalled that Sweden's real estate boom of the late 
1980s and the early 1990s looked very similar to the Japanese  boom. 
Sweden also ended up with all its banks bankrupt  and faced a policy 
problem similar to Japan's. It moved all bad loans into a single bank 
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subordinated  debt, which counted as capital, into the system. The 
Swedish authorities  did not assume that the bank managers  were bad, 
and provided  strong incentives for them. If the debt was not repaid in 
five years, it would convert  into equity  and  be sold in the market,  taking 
control of the bank  away from its present  managers.  He noted that the 
Swedish banking system is now healthy again. Lincoln believed the 
Swedish way would not work  for Japan  because, besides the boom-bust 
cycle in real estate in which everyone got hurt, Japan's  banks suffered 
from  very unethical  behavior  by managers.  He thought  it was important 
to replace bank managers  in Japan, so that the public would see that 
these people were being punished. 
Robert Litan offered a specific plan for dealing with the banking 
problems. He judged that because a large number  of Japanese  banks 
would be severely undercapitalized  if their assets were marked  to mar- 
ket, the only potential  buyers  would be foreign banks  or Japanese  non- 
financial institutions, such as Toyota. He saw this as one reason why 
the authorities  are temporizing  with plans like the bridge  bank, hoping 
to achieve gradual  reform as some banks become healthy and able to 
absorb  the bad loans in the system. Another  reason  is the fear that  more 
bankruptcies  will  undermine the confidence of  households, making 
them  fear  job losses and  increase  saving. As a solution, Litan  suggested 
a massive swap of equity for nonperforming  debt. This would require 
both relaxing the law that now keeps banks from owning more than 5 
percent of any individual company and finding a way to assure that 
future  loans are  made  as arm's  length  transactions.  To remove  cronyism 
from future  lending, Litan recommended  that an RTC-type institution 
take over the delinquent  loans and apply an objective formula  for the 
terms  of debt-for-equity  swaps. 
David Laibson  questioned  the widespread  view that  bank-based  cor- 
porate  governance  systems were to blame for the Pacific Rim crisis. He 
noted that such systems used to be seen as producing a long-term 
perspective,  generating  more  R&D, and  better  information  because  they 
were built on trusted  personal  relationships.  Now that Japan  is in trou- 
ble, the same characteristics  are seen as drawbacks. Laibson argued 
that this new assessment was flawed, in that it compared a poorly 
functioning bank-based system to a first-best equity-based system. 
Rather  than  simply blaming  the system, he suggested  a different  frame- 
work for analyzing the financial problems of Japan  and other Pacific 384  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
Rim economies. He noted  that  during  the 1970s, economists  abandoned 
their traditional view  that financial markets were prone to manias, 
crashes, and panics, and adopted  the view that financial  markets  were 
efficient. However, he found  the evidence that  investors  are  not rational 
or sophisticated  pretty overwhelming, and noted that they tend to ex- 
trapolate  their  own investment  experience  into the future.  For  example, 
those younger than fifty-five forecast 20 percent annual  returns  in the 
equity markets over the next five years, while those over fifty-five 
forecast annual  returns  of only 11 percent. Laibson suggested that in 
Japan  and the rest of East Asia, the spectacular  recent  performance  was 
inappropriately  extrapolated.  Such unrealistic  investment  expectations 
would have caused allocation distortions  under  either a bank-based  or 
an equity-based  system. Edward  J. Lincoln  385 
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